Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Grand Jury; self incrimination; “Double Jeopardy”; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection; Eminent Domain)

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

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The Fifth Amendment (Amendment V) to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights and protects against unfair treatment in legal processes.

The Amendment requires that felonies be tried only upon indictment by a grand jury; the Grand Jury Clause is one of the few provisions of the Bill of Rightsnot held to have been incorporated to the states, most of which have replaced grand juries. The Amendment also provides several trial protections, including the right against self-incrimination (held to also apply to custodial interrogations and before most government bodies) as well as the right to be tried only once (“double jeopardy”) in federal court for the same offense. The Amendment also has a Due Process Clause (similar to the one in the 14th Amendment) as well as an implied equal protection requirement (Bolling v. Sharpe). Finally, the Amendment requires that the power of eminent domain be coupled with “just compensation” for those whose property is taken.




No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.[1]

Infamous crime[edit]

Whether a crime is “infamous” is determined by the nature of the punishment that may be imposed, not the punishment that is actually imposed;[2] however, crimes punishable by death must be tried upon indictments. In United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922), the Supreme Court held that incarceration in a prison or penitentiary, as opposed to a correction or reformation house, attaches infamy to a crime. In Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886), the Supreme Court judged that “‘Infamous crimes’ are thus, in the most explicit words, defined to be those ‘punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.'”, while it later in Green v. United States 356 U.S. 165 (1957), stated that “imprisonment in a penitentiary can be imposed only if a crime is subject to imprisonment exceeding one year”. Therefore an infamous crime is one that is punished by imprisonment for over one year. Susan Brown, a former defense attorney and Professor of Law at the University of Dayton School of Law, concluded: “Since this is essentially the definition of a felony, infamous crimes translate as felonies.”[3]

Grand jury[edit]

Further information: Grand juries in the United States

Grand juries, which return indictments in many criminal cases, are composed of a jury of peers and operate in closed deliberation proceedings; they are given specific instructions regarding the law by the judge. Many constitutional restrictions that apply in court or in other situations do not apply during grand jury proceedings. For example, the exclusionary rule does not apply to certain evidence presented to a grand jury; the exclusionary rule states that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth amendments cannot be introduced in court.[4] Also, an individual does not have the right to have an attorney present in the grand jury room during hearings. An individual would have such a right during questioning by the police while in custody, but an individual testifying before a grand jury is free to leave the grand jury room to consult with his or her attorney outside the room before returning to answer a question.

The Bill of Rights in theNational Archives.

Currently, federal law permits the trial of misdemeanors without indictments.[5] Additionally, in trials of non-capital felonies, the prosecution may proceed without indictments if the defendants waive their Fifth Amendment right.

Grand jury indictments may be amended by the prosecution only in limited circumstances. In Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), the Supreme Court held that the indictment could not be changed at all by the prosecution. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985) partly reversed Ex parte Bain; now, an indictment’s scope may be narrowed by the prosecution. Thus, lesser included charges may be dropped, but new charges may not be added.

The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not protect those serving in the armed forces, whether during wartime or peacetime. Members of the state militia called up to serve with federal forces are not protected under the clause either. In O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), the Supreme Court held that only charges relating to service may be brought against members of the militia without indictments. That decision was overturned in 1987, when the Court held that members of the militia in actual service may be tried for any offense without indictments.[6]

The grand jury indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment has not been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.[7] This means that the grand jury requirement applies only to felony charges in the federal court system. While many states do employ grand juries, no defendant has a Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury for criminal charges in state court. States are free to abolish grand juries, and many (though not all) have replaced them withpreliminary hearing.

Double jeopardy[edit]

Main article: Double Jeopardy Clause
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb …[8]

The Double Jeopardy Clause encompasses four distinct prohibitions: subsequent prosecution after acquittal, subsequent prosecution after conviction, subsequent prosecution after certain mistrials, and multiple punishment in the same indictment.[9] Jeopardy “attaches” when the jury is empaneled in a jury trial, when the first witness is sworn in during a bench trial, or when a plea is accepted unconditionally.[10]

Prosecution after acquittal

The government is not permitted to appeal or try again after the entry of an acquittal, whether a directed verdict before the case is submitted to the jury,[11] a directed verdict after a deadlocked jury,[12] an appellate reversal for sufficiency (except by direct appeal to a higher appellate court),[13] or an “implied acquittal” via conviction of a lesser included offense.[14] In addition, the government is barred by collateral estoppel from re-litigating against the same defense, a fact necessarily found by the jury in a prior acquittal,[15] even if the jury hung on other counts.[16]

This principle does not prevent the government from appealing a pre-trial motion to dismiss[17] or other non-merits dismissal,[18] or a directed verdict after a jury conviction,[19] nor does it prevent the trial judge from entertaining a motion for reconsideration of a directed verdict, if the jurisdiction has so provided by rule or statute.[20] Nor does it prevent the government from retrying the defendant after an appellate reversal other than for sufficiency,[21] including habeas,[22] or “thirteenth juror” appellate reversals notwithstanding sufficiency[23] on the principle that jeopardy has not “terminated.” There is also an exception for judicial bribery in a bench trial.[24]

Multiple punishment, including prosecution after conviction

In Blockburger v. United States (1932), the Supreme Court announced the following test: the government may separately try and punish the defendant for two crimes if each crime contains an element that the other does not.[25] Blockburger is the default rule, unless the legislatively intends to depart; for example, Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) may be punished separately from its predicates,[26] as can conspiracy.[27]

The Blockburger test, originally developed in the multiple punishments context, is also the test for prosecution after conviction.[28] In Grady v. Corbin (1990), the Court held that a double jeopardy violation could lie even where the Blockburger test was not satisfied,[29] but Grady was overruled in United States v. Dixon (1993).[30]

Prosecution after mistrial

The rule for mistrials depends upon who sought the mistrial. If the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, unless the prosecutor acted in “bad faith,” i.e. goaded the defendant into moving for a mistrial because the government specifically wanted a mistrial.[31] If the prosecutor moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial if the trial judge finds “manifest necessity” for granting the mistrial.[32] The same standard governs mistrials granted sua sponte.


The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from being forced to incriminate themselves. Incriminating oneself is defined as exposing oneself (or another person) to “an accusation or charge of crime,” or as involving oneself (or another person) “in a criminal prosecution or the danger thereof.”[33] The privilege against compelled self-incrimination is defined as “the constitutional right of a person to refuse to answer questions or otherwise give testimony against himself or herself. … “[34] To “plead the Fifth” is to refuse to answer any question because “the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked” lead a claimant to possess a “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer”, believing that “a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”[35]

Historically, the legal protection against compelled self-incrimination was directly related to the question of torture for extracting information and confessions.[36][37]

The legal shift away from widespread use of torture and forced confession dates to turmoil of the late 16th and early 17th century in England.[38] Anyone refusing to take the oath ex officio mero (confessions or swearing of innocence, usually before hearing any charges) was considered guilty.[38] Suspected Puritans were pressed to take the oath and then reveal names of other Puritans. Coercion and torture were commonly used to compel “cooperation.” Puritans, who were at the time fleeing to the New World, began a practice of refusing to cooperate with interrogations. In the most famous case John Lilburne refused to take the oath in 1637. His case and his call for “freeborn rights” were rallying points for reforms against forced oaths, forced self-incrimination, and other kinds of coercion. Oliver Cromwell‘s revolution overturned the practice and incorporated protections, in response to a popular group of English citizens known as the Levellers. The Levellers presented The Humble Petition of Many Thousands to Parliament in 1647 with 13 demands, third of which was the right against self-incrimination in criminal cases. These protections were brought to America by Puritans, and were later incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Bill of Rights.

Protection against compelled self-incrimination is implicit in the Miranda rights statement, which protects the “right to remain silent.” This amendment is also similar to Section 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In other Commonwealth of Nations countries like Australia and New Zealand, the right to silence of the accused both during questioning and at trial is regarded as an important right inherited from common law, and is protected in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and in Australia through various federal and state acts and codes governing the criminal justice system.

In South African law the right to silence originating from English common law has been entrenched in Section 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.

The Supreme Court has held that “a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.”[39]

Legal proceeding[edit]

The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies when an individual is called to testify in a legal proceeding.[40] The Supreme Court ruled that the privilege applies whether the witness is in a federal court or, under the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a state court,[41] and whether the proceeding itself is criminal or civil.[42]

The right to remain silent was asserted at grand jury or congressional hearings in the 1950s, when witnesses testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities or the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee claimed the right in response to questions concerning their alleged membership in the Communist Party. Under the Red Scare hysteria at the time ofMcCarthyism, witnesses who refused to answer the questions were accused as “fifth amendment communists”. They lost jobs or positions in unions and other political organizations, and suffered other repercussions after “taking the Fifth.”

Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisc.) asked, “Are you now, or have you ever been a member of the Communist party,” while he was chairman of the Senate Government Operations Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Admitting to a previous communist party membership was not sufficient. Witnesses were also required to “name names,” to implicate others they knew to be communists or who had been communists in the past. Academy Award winning director Elia Kazan testified before the House Committee on Un-American Activities that he had belonged to the Communist Party briefly in his youth. He also “named names,” which incurred enmity of many in Hollywood. Other entertainers such as Zero Mostel found themselves on aHollywood blacklist after taking the Fifth, and were unable to find work for a while in the show business.

The amendment has also been used by defendants and witnesses in criminal cases involving the Mafia.[citation needed]

The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect an individual who testifies before a non-governmental, self-regulatory organization—such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—and the SRO provides information about that testimony to law enforcement agencies who then prosecute the individual, even though the SRO has the power to suspend the individual from its membership. An SRO itself is not a court of law, and cannot send a person to jail. SROs, such as the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), are generally not considered to be state actors. See United States v. Solomon,[43] D. L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc.,[44] and Marchiano v. NASD,[45] SROs also lack subpoena powers, so they rely heavily on requiring testimony from individuals by wielding the threat of a bar from the industry (permanent, if decided by the NASD) when the individual asserts his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

Custodial interrogation[edit]

The Fifth Amendment limits the use of evidence obtained illegally by law enforcement officers. Originally, at common law, even a confession obtained by torture was admissible. However, by the eighteenth century, common law in England provided that coerced confessions were inadmissible. The common law rule was incorporated into American law by the courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly overruled convictions based on such confessions, in cases such as Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

Law enforcement responded by switching to more subtle techniques, but the courts held that such techniques, even if they do not involve physical torture, may render a confession involuntary and inadmissible. In Chambers v. Florida (1940) the Court held a confession obtained after five days of prolonged questioning, during which time the defendant was held incommunicado, to be coerced. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944), the suspect had been interrogated continuously for thirty-six hours under electric lights. In Haynes v. Washington,[46] the Court held that an “unfair and inherently coercive context” including a prolonged interrogation rendered a confession inadmissible.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was a landmark case involving confessions. Ernesto Miranda had signed a statement confessing the crime, but the Supreme Court held that the confession was inadmissible because the defendant had not been advised of his rights.

The Court held, “the prosecution may not use statements … stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Custodial interrogation is initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of movement before being questioned as to the specifics of the crime.

As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Before any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” The warning to which Chief Justice Earl Warren referred is now called the Miranda warning, and it is customarily delivered by the police to an individual before questioning.

Miranda has been clarified by several further Supreme Court rulings. For the warning to be necessary, the questioning must be conducted under “custodial” circumstances. A person detained in jail or under arrest is, of course, deemed to be in police custody. Alternatively, a person who is under the reasonable belief that he may not freely leave from the restraint of law enforcement is also deemed to be in “custody.” That determination of “reasonableness” is based on a totality of the objective circumstances. A mere presence at a police station may not be sufficient, but neither is such a presence required. Traffic stops are not deemed custodial. The Court has ruled that age can be an objective factor. In Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004), the Court held that “a state-court decision that failed to mention a 17-year-old’s age as part of the Miranda custody analysis was not objectively unreasonable”.[47] In her concurring opinionJustice O’Connor wrote that a suspect’s age may indeed “be relevant to the ‘custody’ inquiry”;[48] the Court did not find it relevant in the specific case of Alvarado. The Court affirmed that age could be a relevant and objective factor in J.D.B. v. North Carolina where they ruled that “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test”[47]

The questioning does not have to be explicit to trigger Miranda rights. For example, two police officers engaging in a conversation designed to elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect would constitute questioning. A person may choose to waive his Miranda rights, but the prosecution has the burden of showing that such a waiver was actually made.

A confession not preceded by a Miranda warning where one was necessary cannot be admitted as evidence against the confessing party in a judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court, however, has held that if a defendant voluntarily testifies at the trial that he did not commit the crime, his confession may be introduced to challenge his credibility, to “impeach” the witness, even if it had been obtained without the warning.

In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 on June 21, 2004 that the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments do not give people the right to refuse to give their name when questioned by police where a state’s stop and identify statutes obligate disclosure of such information.

In June 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Berghuis v. Thompkins that criminal suspects must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent. Unless and until the suspect actually states that they are relying on that right, their subsequent voluntary statements can be used in court and police can continue to interact with (or question) them. The mere act of remaining silent is, on its own, insufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights. Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as implying a waiver.

The Act of Production Doctrine[edit]

Under the Act of Production Doctrine, the act of an individual in producing documents or materials (e.g., in response to a subpoena) may have a “testimonial aspect” for purposes of the individual’s right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that the individual’s act of production provides information not already in the hands of law enforcement personnel about the (1) existence; (2) custody; or (3) authenticity, of the documents or materials produced. See United States v. Hubbell.

Refusal to testify in a criminal case[edit]

The Supreme Court ruled that the government cannot punish a criminal defendant for exercising his right to silence, by allowing the prosecutor to ask the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the defendant’s refusal to testify in his own defense. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Griffin, the Court overturned as unconstitutional under the federal constitution a provision of the California state constitution that explicitly granted such power to prosecutors.

Refusal to testify in a civil case[edit]

While defendants are entitled to assert the privilege against compelled self-incrimination in a civil court case, there are consequences to the assertion of the privilege in such an action.

The Supreme Court has held that “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano,[49] “[A]s Mr. Justice Brandeis declared, speaking for a unanimous court in the Tod case, ‘Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.'”[50] “‘Failure to contest an assertion … is considered evidence of acquiescence … if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.'”[51]

In Baxter, the state was entitled to an adverse inference against Palmigiano because of the evidence against him and his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Some civil cases are considered “criminal cases” for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In Boyd v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “A proceeding to forfeit a person’s goods for an offence against the laws, though civil in form, and whether in rem or in personam, is a “criminal case” within the meaning of that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person “shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.”[52]

Federal income tax[edit]

In some cases, individuals may be legally required to file reports that call for information that may be used against them in criminal cases. In United States v. Sullivan,[53] the United States Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer could not invoke the Fifth Amendment’s protections as the basis for refusing to file a required federal income tax return. The Court stated: “If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged from making[,] he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide what, if anything, he might have withheld.”[54]

In Garner v. United States,[55] the defendant was convicted of crimes involving a conspiracy to “fix” sporting contests and to transmit illegal bets. During the trial the prosecutor introduced, as evidence, the taxpayer’s federal income tax returns for various years. In one return the taxpayer had showed his occupation to be “professional gambler.” In various returns the taxpayer had reported income from “gambling” or “wagering.” The prosecution used this to help contradict the taxpayer’s argument that his involvement was innocent. The taxpayer tried unsuccessfully to keep the prosecutor from introducing the tax returns as evidence, arguing that since the taxpayer was legally required to report the illegal income on the returns, he was being compelled to be a witness against himself. The Supreme Court agreed that he was legally required to report the illegal income on the returns, but ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination still did not apply. The Court stated that “if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the Government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.”[56]

Sullivan and Garner are viewed as standing, in tandem, for the proposition that on a required federal income tax return a taxpayer would probably have to report the amount of the illegal income, but might validly claim the privilege by labeling the item “Fifth Amendment” (instead of “illegal gambling income,” “illegal drug sales,” etc.)[57] The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated: “Although the source of income might be privileged, the amount must be reported.”[58] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated: “. … theamount of a taxpayer’s income is not privileged even though the source of income may be, and Fifth Amendment rights can be exercised in compliance with the tax laws “by simply listing his alleged ill-gotten gains in the space provided for ‘miscellaneous’ income on his tax form.”[59] In another case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: “While the source of some of [the defendant] Johnson’s income may have been privileged, assuming that the jury believed his uncorroborated testimony that he had illegal dealings in gold in 1970 and 1971, the amount of his income was not privileged and he was required to pay taxes on it.”[60] In 1979, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated: “A careful reading of Sullivan and Garner, therefore, is that the self-incrimination privilege can be employed to protect the taxpayer from revealing the information as to an illegal source of income, but does not protect him from disclosing the amount of his income.”[61]

Grants of immunity[edit]

If the government gives an individual immunity, then that individual may be compelled to testify. Immunity may be “transactional immunity” or “use immunity”; in the former, the witness is immune from prosecution for offenses related to the testimony; in the latter, the witness may be prosecuted, but his testimony may not be used against him. In Kastigar v. United States,[62] the Supreme Court held that the government need only grant use immunity to compel testimony. The use immunity, however, must extend not only to the testimony made by the witness, but also to all evidence derived therefrom. This scenario most commonly arises in cases related to organized crime.

Record keeping[edit]

A statutorily required record-keeping system may go too far such that it implicates a record-keeper’s right against self-incrimination. A three part test laid out by Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board,[63] is used to determine this: 1. the law targets a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities; 2. the activities sought to be regulated are already permeated with criminal statutes as opposed to essentially being non-criminal and largely regulatory; and 3. the disclosure compelled creates a likelihood of prosecution and is used against the record-keeper. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down an order by the Subversive Activities Control Board requiring members of the Communist Party to register with the government and upheld an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, on the grounds that statute under which the order had been issued was “directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.”

In Leary v. United States,[64] the court struck down the Marijuana Tax Act because its record keeping statute required self-incrimination.

In Haynes v. United States,[65] the Supreme Court ruled that, because convicted felons are prohibited from owning firearms, requiring felons to register any firearms they owned constituted a form of self-incrimination and was therefore unconstitutional.

Computer passwords[edit]

Courts have given conflicting decisions on whether forced disclosure of computer passwords is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In In re Boucher (2009), the US District Court of Vermont ruled that the Fifth Amendment might protect a defendant from having to reveal an encryption password, or even the existence of one, if the production of that password could be deemed a self-incriminating “act” under the Fifth Amendment. In Boucher, production of the unencrypted drive was deemed not to be a self-incriminating act, as the government already had sufficient evidence to tie the encrypted data to the defendant.[66]

In January 2012 a federal judge in Denver ruled that a bank-fraud suspect was required to give an unencrypted copy of a laptop hard drive to prosecutors.[67][68] However, in February 2012 the Eleventh Circuit ruled otherwise – finding that requiring a defendant to produce an encrypted drive’s password would violate the Constitution, becoming the first federal circuit court to rule on the issue.[69][70] In April 2013, a District Court magistrate judge in Wisconsin refused to compel a suspect to provide the encryption password to his hard drive after FBI agents had unsuccessfully spent months trying to decrypt the data.[71][72]


Corporations may also be compelled to maintain and turn over records; the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination extend only to “natural persons.”[73] The Court has also held that a corporation’s custodian of records can be forced to produce corporate documents even if the act of production would incriminate him personally.[74] The only limitation on this rule is that the jury cannot be told that the custodian personally produced those documents in any subsequent prosecution of him or her, but the jury is still allowed to draw adverse inferences from the content of the documents combined with the position of the custodian in the corporation.

As a condition of employment, workers may be required to answer their employer’s narrowly defined questions regarding conduct on the job. If an employee invokes the Garrity rule(sometimes called the Garrity Warning or Garrity Rights) before answering the questions, then the answers cannot be used in criminal prosecution of the employee.[75] This principle was developed in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). The rule is most commonly applied to public employees such as police officers.

In Boyd v. United States,[76] the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers to make the nonproduction of them a confession of the allegations which it is pretended they will prove”.

On June 1, 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Berghuis v. Thompkins that the right was non-self-executing and a criminal suspect must specifically invoke the right against self-incrimination in order for constitutional protections to apply.[77] The case centered around the interrogation of murder suspect Van Chester Thompkins, who remained virtually silent for hours, before giving a few brief responses to police questions. Most significantly, Thompkins answered “yes” when asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?” The statement was introduced at trial and Thompkins was convicted. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that criminal suspects who do not clearly state their intention to remain silent are presumed to have waived their Fifth Amendment rights. Ironically, suspects must speak in order for their silence to be legally protected. The new rule will defer to police in cases where the suspect fails to unambiguously assert the right to remain silent.

Salinas v. Texas[edit]

The Supreme Court extended the standard from Berghuis v. Thompkins in Salinas v. Texas in 2013, holding that a suspect’s silence in response to a specific question posed during an interview with police when the suspect was not in custody and the suspect had been voluntarily answering other questions during that interview could be used against him in court where he did not explicitly invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence in response to the specific question.[78] Of the five justices who concluded that the suspect’s silence could be used against him in these circumstances, Justices Alito, Roberts and Kennedy concluded that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment claim failed because he did not expressly invoke the privilege. The other two Justices, Thomas and Scalia, concluded that the defendant’s claim would fail even if he had invoked the privilege, on the theory that the prosecutor’s comment at the trial—regarding the defendant’s silence in response to a question during the police interview—did not compel the defendant to give self-incriminating testimony.[79] The Court stated that there was no “ritualistic formula” necessary to assert this privilege, but that a person could not do so “by simply standing mute.” If an individual fails to invoke his right, and is later charged with a crime, the prosecution may use his silence at trial as evidence of his guilt.[80]

Due process[edit]

Main article: Due Process Clause

Takings clause[edit]

Eminent domain[edit]

Main article: Eminent domain

The Supreme Court has held that the federal government and each state has the power of eminent domain—the power to take private property for “public use“. The Takings Clause, the last clause of the Fifth Amendment, limits the power of eminent domain by requiring that “just compensation” be paid if private property is taken for public use. The just compensation provision of the Fifth Amendment did not originally apply directly to the states, but since Chicago, B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897), federal courts have held that the Fourteenth Amendmentextended the effects of that provision to the states. The federal courts, however, have shown much deference to the determinations of Congress, and even more so to the determinations of the state legislatures, of what constitutes “public use”. The property need not actually be used by the public; rather, it must be used or disposed of in such a manner as to benefit the public welfare or public interest. One exception that restrains the federal government is that the property must be used in exercise of a government’s enumerated powers.

The owner of the property that is taken by the government must be justly compensated. When determining the amount that must be paid, the government does not need to take into account any speculative schemes in which the owner claims the property was intended to be used. Normally, the fair market value of the property determines “just compensation”. If the property is taken before the payment is made, interest accrues (though the courts have refrained from using the term “interest”).

The federal courts have not restrained state and local governments from seizing privately owned land for private commercial development on behalf of private developers. This was upheld on June 23, 2005, when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kelo v. City of New London. This 5–4 decision remains controversial. The majority opinion, by Justice Stevens, found that it was appropriate to defer to the city’s decision that the development plan had a public purpose, saying that “the city has carefully formulated a development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including, but not limited to, new jobs and increased tax revenue.” Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion observed that in this particular case the development plan was not “of primary benefit to … the developer” and that if that was the case the plan might have been impermissible. In the dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that this decision would allow the rich to benefit at the expense of the poor, asserting that “Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.” She argued that the decision eliminates “any distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby effectively delete[s] the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment”. A number of states, in response to Kelo, have passed laws and/or state constitutional amendments which make it more difficult for state governments to seize private land. Takings that are not “for public use” are not directly covered by the doctrine,[81] however such a taking might violate due process rights under the Fourteenth amendment, or other applicable law.

The exercise of the police power of the state resulting in a taking of private property was long held to be an exception to the requirement of government paying just compensation. However the growing trend under the various state constitution’s taking clauses is to compensate innocent third parties whose property was destroyed or “taken” as a result of police action.[82]

“Just compensation”[edit]

The last two words of the amendment promise “just compensation” for takings by the government. In United States v. 50 Acres of Land (1984), the Supreme Court wrote that “The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be measured by “the market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money.” Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) … Deviation from this measure of just compensation has been required only “when market value has been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public.” United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).

Equal liberty[edit]

The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment was relied upon by the Supreme Court to overturn section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, a provision that defined marriage as being only the legal union of one man and one woman for purposes of various federal statutes and regulations.[83]


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  83. Jump up^ UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR 570 U. S. (2013)

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

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